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The terrorist attack in 2001 left the United States with a sense of vulnerability and 
generated both demand and need to protect the nation. Fortifying the border has created 
diminishing returns. In addition, it has created negative side effects and unintended 
consequences that undermine the very nature and reason for installing border fences. 
Immigrants have been forced into the hands of criminal organizations and are more 
vulnerable now than in the past. Building a wall has deterred some illicit activity, but it 
does not deter the motivational factors. By hardening the borderline, the U.S. has issued a 
challenge, practically daring anyone to attempt entry though immigration has been 
reduced, drug trafficking organizations (DTOs) have picked up the gauntlet thrown by 
the United States and are finding ingenious methods to overcome and bypass the 
tightening border controls. Determined and motivated people will continue to find a way, 
even if it takes multiple times to find loopholes and weakness in the border. Border 
policy has resulted in unintended consequences, specifically, attracting DTOs, 
stimulating innovation, creating sophisticated networks within the black market arena, 
and rendering the fence obsolete. The cost effectiveness of current border security 
practices have reached the culminating point. Policymakers need to find alternative 
solutions, because current methods are unsustainable.  
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I. RE-CASTING THE U.S.-MEXICO BORDER SECURITY NET 
A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
After the eye-opening events of September 11, 2001, homeland security became a 
major focus of the United States government. Specifically, an increased emphasis was 
placed on securing the U.S. borders, including improving the security framework and 
policies to prevent another terrorist attack, including defensive barriers.1 A principal 
argument often debated by the opposition to defensive barriers is that the cost of security 
has become too expensive and has created unintended consequences.2 For example, in 
2012 463 illegal immigrants were found dead in the desert; they died trying to enter the 
United States.3 This is the result of the “funnel effect” created by the militarization of the 
United States-Mexico border: an increased number of physical barriers and personnel, 
high-tech infrastructure, fortified highway checkpoints, and other security enhancements 
have merged to deflect unauthorized immigrants away from highly trafficked and 
relatively safe urban areas and into remote and dangerous sections of hot, waterless 
desert.4 Opponents of border walls debate the opportunity cost associated with building 
defensive barriers and argue that the money would be better spent on alternative 
solutions, such as an open border, immigration reform, and targeting drug organizations.5 
This thesis will analyze the return on investment and unintended consequences associated 
with establishing defensive barriers on the U.S.-Mexico border to answer the question: 
how cost effective is the U.S.-Mexico defensive barrier as a solution? 
                                                 
1 White House, National Security Strategy for Combating Terrorism (Washington, DC: White House 
2003), 24–25, 27. 
2 Tony Payan, “Border Security and (Mis-) Management,” Houston Chronicle, July 29, 2013, 
http://blog.chron.com/bakerblog/2013/07/border-security-and-mis-management/. 
3 U.S. Customs and Border Protection, U.S. Border Patrol Southwest Border Deaths by Fiscal Year 
(Washington, DC: U.S. Customs and Border Protection, 2013).  
4 Raquel Rubio-Goldsmith, Melissa M. McCormick, Daniel Martinez, and Inez M. Duarte, The 
“Funnel Effect” and Recovered Bodies of Unauthorized Migrants Processed by the Pima County Office of 
the Medical Examiner, 1990–2005 (Tucson, AZ: Binational Migration Institute, University of Arizona, 
2006), 30. 
5 Adam Isacson and Maureen Meyer, Beyond the Border Buildup: Security and Migrants along the 
U.S.-Mexico Border (Washington DC: Washington Office of Latin America, 2012), 32, 47–49. 
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B. IMPORTANCE  
U.S. politicians have primarily focused on using hard-power resolutions to create 
a hardened U.S.-Mexico border through the construction of fences and to increase the 
number of border agents within the last two decades.6 The strategy of creating tall and 
intimidating barriers is a form of deterrence and directs people to the ports of entry (POE) 
locations. 7 The ability to make “another to act in ways in which that entity would not 
have acted otherwise,” according to Ernest Wilson, is the definition of hard power.8 
Defensive barriers are a symbolic representation of the state’s capacity to control its 
borders. Additionally, Michael Fisher, U.S. Border Patrol Chief, describes a secure 
border as “living free from fear in their (border communities) towns and cities. For other 
American communities, it means enjoying benefits of a well-managed border that 
facilitates the flow of legitimate trade and travel.”9 However, defensive barriers could 
create a false sense of security because U.S.-Mexican border fortifications are not 100 
percent effective or efficient against neither illegal immigration nor drug smuggling. The 
increase in U.S.-Mexico border agents and the building of defensive barriers still have 
vulnerabilities that drug trafficking organizations (DTOs) can exploit.10  
Understanding the complex security dilemma is necessary to protect the United 
States and to determine how the methods to achieve security could be improved. No 
individual approach can achieve an impeccable and flawless solution that will protect the 
U.S., but increasing the overlap of security policies could increase their effectiveness. 
Assessing how current policies are mitigating risk will assist in understanding the 
                                                 
6 Edward Alden, “Immigration and Border Control,” Cato Journal 32, no 1 (Winter 2012), 107. 
7 Marc Rosenblum, Border Security: Immigration Enforcement between Ports of Entry (Washington, 
DC: Congressional Research Service, 2013), 4. 
8 Ernest J. Wilson, “Hard Power, Soft Power, Smart Power,” The Annals of the American Academy of 
Political and Social Science 616, (March, 2008): 114. 
9 House of Representatives Subcommittee on Border and Maritime Security, What Does A Secure 
Border Look Like? (Washington, DC: U.S. House of Representatives, 2013), 
http://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=732013, 2. 
10 United States Department of Justice defines Drug Trafficking Organizations as, “Complex 
Organizations with Highly Defined Command-and-Control Structures that Produce, Transport, and/or 
Distribute Large Quantities of One or More Illicit Drugs.” National Drug Threat Assessment 2010, 
accessed January 18, 2014. www.justice.gov/archive/ndic/pubs38/38661/dtos.htm.  
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problem and identifying the gaps in border security. The comprehension of these security 
gaps is essential to create and put in place efficient solutions and standards of 
measurement to produce a more holistic and effective resolution to address the situation.  
This thesis will raise awareness and potentially promote the initials steps to 
change the current U.S. philosophy on border security. All taxpayers and the U.S. 
government have an investment in U.S. security and should care about security in North 
America, especially those living close to the border regions. If successful, this thesis will 
analyze the overall effectiveness of defensive barriers on the U.S.-Mexico border.  
C. HYPOTHESES AND PROBLEMS 
Two possible hypotheses can be formulated based on the literature about 
defensive barriers. The first hypothesis is that barriers are useful and successful at 
deterring illegal immigration, drug trafficking, and are cost effective. Defensive barriers 
are needed to secure America and build what critics call “Fortress America.”11 The 
second is that barriers are unsuccessful since they become a target for increased illicit 
activity and create diminished returns. There are various recommendations for alternative 
solutions, such as immigration reform or targeting DTOs funds, to solving the U.S. 
security dilemma of illegal immigration and DTOs.  
A defensive barrier as the primary security solution generates more problems than 
it solves; this is because the border security dilemma has created a “wicked problem,” 
meaning that it portrays a difficult problem that is impossible to solve because it is 
inconsistent, incomplete, and has dynamic conditions. The problem itself is impervious to 
a solution and thereby any solution continues to create more dilemmas, which in turn 
continue to compound rather than solve the problem.12 Also, barriers arguably encourage 
DTOs to innovate ways to defeat the system rather than discourage illicit behavior.  
                                                 
11 John J. Noble, “Fortress America or Fortress North America?” Law and Business Review of the 
Americas 15, 3/4 (Summer/Fall 2005): 520; John J. Noble, “A Secure Border? The Canadian View,” in 
Immigration Policy and the Terrorist Threat in Canada and the United States, edited by Alexander Moens 
and Martin Collacott (Vancouver, BC: Fraser Institute, 2008), 175. 
12 Churchman C. West, “Wicked Problems,” Management Science, 14, no. 4 (December 1967): B141–
B142. 
 4
Another problem is the lack of data on successful illegal entries. Current data 
collection is based on whom and what is actually caught along the border. For example, 
the U.S. Border Patrol (USBP) reports annually only the successful apprehensions. The 
amount of successful violations is unrecorded and this leaves an unknown number that 
cannot be accounted for when analyzing the cost-benefits of a defensive barrier. The data 
that can be analyzed include: expenses for building a fence; increases in border patrol 
manpower; and the increase in the amount of both personnel and contraband confiscated. 
Without the actual data, opportunity costs are skewed. 13 The preliminary hypothesis is 
that fences are not effective in curbing illegal immigration or drug trafficking. 
D. LITERATURE REVIEW 
1. Fences Are Necessary 
In response to illegal immigration and counter-narcoterrorism, the border fence 
subject has arguments for and against the effectiveness of its deployment along the 
border. First, a fence has a valuable effect on deterring illegal immigration and drug 
trafficking along the U.S.-Mexico border.14 Paul Staniland argues that the first step to 
stopping unwanted border crossings is to contain the problem by building and 
maintaining a defensive barrier—a fence—which would increase the risk and cost to 
those trying to infiltrate America by increasing the difficulty of succeeding at 
infiltrating.15 
Eventually, the cost of crossing the defensive barrier will outweigh the benefits.16 
Jonathan Rynhold analyzed the conflict of a security wall between Israel and the West 
Bank in Palestine. Although a defensive barrier may not be the ideal solution, “however, 
if implemented wisely, the barrier could turn out to be the best means available.”17 David 
                                                 
13 Tevfik Nas, Cost-Benefit Analysis: Theory and Application (Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE 
Publications, 1996), 64. 
14 Paul Staniland, “Defeating Transnational Insurgencies: The Best Offense is a Good Fence,” The 
Washington Quarterly 29, no 1 (Winter 2005): 22. 
15 Ibid., 31. 
16 Ibid., 31–32. 
17 Jonathan Rynhold, “Israel’s Fence: Can Separation Make Better Neighbors?” Survival 46, no. 1 
(Spring 2004): 72. 
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Makovsky remarks that the fence has reduced terrorist infiltration greatly in Israel. Even 
though it is not a hundred percent effective, the fence is still seen as a success due to the 
reduction of attempts. Even with some penetration, the people continue to want defensive 
barriers for security reasons.18 After September 11, 2001, this same reason, security, was 
a driving motivator for the U.S. to fortifying its borders.19 Since the wall has been built, 
the U.S. Border Patrol reports that apprehensions have been at an all-time low similar to 
1971 statistics; 2011 was the lowest with 340,252 and 2012 the second lowest with 
364,768.20 Senator John McCain stated, “The border is not secure. But it’s a lot more 
secure than it was back in 1986 when we gave amnesty to 3 million people.”21 
2. Fences Are Unnecessary 
The opposing view is that security barriers are not providing an effective tool 
against counter-narcoterrorism and illegal immigration. Tony Payan agrees, stating “that 
the border has become even more guarded and tightly controlled” over the last 150 
years.22 He argues that since border security has been escalating, there has not been a 
return on investment. He further states that immigration and drug trafficking are separate 
issues, but the United States government considers them to be the same, even though 
drugs are smuggled in differently than people. The unilateral approach of investing 
billions of dollars into defensive barriers for three separate problems is not a long-term 
solution, nor is it succeeding.23 Peter Andreas and Thomas Biersteker investigate 
different trade-security scenarios for North America and offer a different point of view 
                                                 
18 David Makovsky, “How to Build a Fence,” Foreign Affairs, 83, no. 2 (2004): 55–56. 
19 White House, National Security Strategy for Combating Terrorism (Washington, DC: White House 
2003), 24–25, 27 
20 U.S. Customs and Border Protection, “U.S. Border Patrol Apprehension Statistics Fiscal Year 
1925–2012,” accessed August 02, 2013, 
http://www.cbp.gov/linkhandler/cgov/border_security/border_patrol/usbp_statistics/usbp_fy12_stats/appr_s
tats_1925_2012.ctt/appr_stats_1925_2012.pdf.  
21 I-Hsien Sherwood, “Immigration Reform News 2013: Bill Will Create Jobs, McCain Tells 
Republican Crowds,” Latin Post, August 14, 2013, 
http://www.latinpost.com/articles/1487/20130814/immigration-reform-news-2013-bill-will-create-jobs-
mccain-tells.htm. 
22 Tony Payan, The Three U.S.-Mexico Border Wars (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 
2006), 14–15. 
23 Ibid., 16–17, 19–21, 122. 
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about borders. At one end, there is the potential scenario for European border style where 
multi-countries share open borders to create a “Fortress North America,” where Mexico, 
Canada, and the United States form a unified region with all borders open to each other 
and increase external security to the North America territory. The opposing option to 
“Fortress North America” is at the opposite spectrum, to constrict and harden America’s 
borders to defend only “Fortress America.” Proponents argue that open borders and 
security can be interlinked for economic regional cooperation. In contrast, border security 
itself has become a barrier to commerce.24 
Brent Sterling’s book, Do Good Fences Make Good Neighbors, examines six 
historical cases of strategic barriers, fences, and walls, and how they are not unique. He 
highlights how barriers affect the enemy’s strategy, shape politics, and alter strategic 
balances. In ancient Greece, Sterling illustrates the unintended consequences of Athens’ 
Long Walls. These walls instilled complacency and overconfidence in the leadership. The 
physical barrier became either a target for enemies to destroy or channels them to search 
and exploit for weaker unprotected areas elsewhere. Eventually, all walls are defeated. A 
wall is a symbol of the country’s vulnerability and its inability to solve a problem. 
According to Sterling, often walls are built to “muddle through” and evade difficult 
political decisions.25  
In another work, Border Games by Peter Andreas demonstrates that “the 
escalation of border policing has ultimately been less about deterring the flow of drugs 
and migrants, then about recrafting the image of the border.”26 Through the use of 
symbols, he argues that the perception of U.S. control of the U.S.-Mexico border is more 
about power than reducing illegal infiltration itself. Command of the border is a symbol 
of the state’s control, even though the border has never been successfully managed. The 
                                                 
24 Peter Andreas, “A Tale of Two Borders,” in The Rebordering of North America, ed. Peter Andreas 
and Thomas. J. Biersteker (New York: Routledge, 2003), 14–15. 
25 Brent Sterling, Do Fences Make Good Neighbor’s? What History Teaches Us about Strategic 
Barriers and International Security (Washington DC: Georgetown Press, 2009), 325. 
26 Peter Andreas, Border Games, 2nd ed. (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2000), xiv. 
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idea that a border is open to trade, but closed to illegal activities, drug trafficking and 
illicit immigration, is nothing more than an illusion in a globalized world.27 
Stephen Flynn emphasizes how other historic powers have built walls—Maginot 
Line, Berlin Wall, and Great Wall of China—at an enormous cost, only to fail in the 
original reason for building a barrier.28 The cost continues to increase because barriers 
create opportunities for illegal professionals, “coyotes,” to furnish smuggling operations. 
In addition, as the border becomes fortified, the risk and benefits associated with illicit 
activities also increase, creating a demand for more experienced criminals than naïve 
lawbreakers to smuggle drugs through ports of entry.29  
In Terry Goddard’s three-part series, “How to Fix a Broken Border,” he states 
walls do not work because “the cartels have the capacity to go over, under, around, and 
even through virtually any physical barrier.”30 As Janet Napolitano said, “You show me a 
50-foot wall and I’ll show you a 51-foot ladder at the border. That’s the way the border 
works.”31 This demonstrates that alternative solutions are needed more than the defensive 
barrier response and that politicians are aware of this. 
3. Alternative Solutions 
As the United States continues to build fences, manpower has also been increased 
to monitor the border. In fact, it has grown exponentially since 1990s. Different solutions 
have been brought forward that are better alternatives to building fences. Examples of 
these are open borders and immigration reform; and the objective of border security 
should be drug organizations instead of immigrants. 
                                                 
27 Ibid., 7–9. 
28 Stephen E. Flynn, “The False Conundrum,” in The Rebordering of North America, ed. Peter 
Andreas and Thomas. J. Biersteker (New York: Routledge, 2003), 112. 
29 Ibid., 112–114. 
30 Terry Goddard, “How to Fix a Broken Border: Disrupting Smuggling at its Source,” May 17, 2012, 
http://www.immigrationpolicy.org/perspectives/how-fix-broken-border-three-part-series, 12. 
31 Marc Lacey, “Arizona Officials, Fed Up with U.S. Efforts, Seek Donations to Build Border Fence,” 
New York Times, July 19, 2011, www.nytimes.com/2011/07/20/us/20border.html?_r=0.  
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a. Open Border 
Stephen Flynn argues that the U.S. escalated reaction to September 11, 2001 
“imposes a blockade on its own economy.”32 An open, smart border can protect 
America’s security and economic interests, especially if the security and open border are 
compatible, and they strengthen each other. An open border can reduce security risks, 
unlike a closed border that becomes a target for escalated illegal activities at the border, 
and a potential terrorist threat. Instead of worrying about a geographic line, cooperative 
policies should expand the security framework and tactics to catch illicit activity before it 
reaches the border. Technology and techniques need to be created and implemented to 
allow people and trade to flow, while stopping terrorism. Instead of looking for “a needle 
in a haystack,” smart-border technology, such as safeguarding transportation networks, 
shipment tracking, equipping vehicles with transponders coded to a particular handprint 
or retina, and detecting abnormalities, could reduce the risk at the border region.33 Data 
management and cooperative intelligence should be expanded to manage risk more 
efficiently. Some expanded incentives include encouraging low-risk everyday travelers to 
increase cooperation and reduce the need for criminal activity. 34 
b. Immigration Policy 
Authors Massey, Durand, and Malone argue that American politicians are 
reaching for an unrealistic goal.35 They examine the overall history of U.S. immigration 
as a complex organism that should not have been revised without understanding the 
system. Prior to 9/11, the policymakers turned a predictable functioning system into a 
noisy jalopy that created more unintended consequences that are not in the best interests 
of either the U.S. or Mexico. The U.S. policy presents a contradiction, because leaders 
want to keep the border open for trade, yet keep people out; post 9/11 has exacerbated 
                                                 
32 Flynn, “The False Conundrum,” 117. 
33 Ibid., 115–18. 
34 Ibid., 122–125. 
35 Douglas S. Massey, Jorge Durand, and Nolan J. Malone, Beyond Smoke and Mirrors: Mexican 
Immigration in an Era of Economic Integration (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2002), 2. 
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this. They highlight that building “Fortress America” is an unrealistic illusion of “smoke 
and mirrors.”36  
In another viewpoint, Eric Olson and David Shirk argue for immigration to be 
separate from border security. They want to “widen the gates” by creating more work 
visas for the majority of law-abiding illegal immigrants. They advocate that resources 
should be spent on tracking systems to monitor visa expirations that labor laws are 
conforming to.37 Creating a better legal immigration policy could weaken the demand for 
black-markets, create the seasonal migration cycle again, and generate more U.S. tax 
revenues. This would allow both CBP and BP to focus more on providing protection 
from terrorists and drug trafficking organizations than illegal immigration. 38  
c. Drug Organizations 
In Terry Goddard’s three-part series, “How to Fix a Broken Border,” he states that 
the U.S. needs a broader more effective strategy to securing the border. Instead of 
wasting resources on building up the border, he recommends targeting and deterring 
transnational criminal organizations. These organizations are the ones who are innovating 
and breaching security. As long as a profit can be made through drug or human 
smuggling, these illicit activities will continue. Since cartels operate as a business, the 
goal should be to target their money. Instead of targeting immigrants who once caught, 
will pay the cartels to smuggle them back in, the correct target should be the drug 
trafficking organizations that are profiting from illegal smuggling. Goddard offers 
solutions by focusing on customs enforcement, closing loopholes for money-laundering, 
and on the money itself. Goddard recommends that a bi-national coordinated effort is 
needed.39 
                                                 
36 Ibid., 6. 
37 Eric Olson and David Shirk, “Is More Getting Us Less? Real Solutions for Securing Our Border,” 
2011, accessed July 12, 2013, http://www.immigrationpolicy.org/perspectives/more-getting-us-less-real-
solutions-securing-our-border, 6 
38 Ibid., 4, 6. 
39 Terry Goddard, “How to Fix a Broken Border: A Three Part Series,” May 17, 2012, 
http://www.immigrationpolicy.org/perspectives/how-fix-broken-border-three-part-series.  
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d. Measures of Effectiveness 
In response to September 11, 2001, Howard Kunreuther used examples to 
examine how risk assessment models can be interconnected with the risk perception 
knowledge and to improve risk management opportunities for handling unknown and 
catastrophic incidents.40 Kunreuther concludes that individuals need to be educated on 
consequences of catastrophic events, to reduce fear and anxiety and so these informed 
people can allocate funding better.41 John Mueller and Mark Stewart analyze how the 
government has spent over one trillion dollars on homeland security since 9/11. Both 
authors criticize the government for concentrating on worst-case scenarios and focusing 
on terrorist attack outcomes, rather than risk assessment and risk mitigation. “Risk 
management decisions seek to reduce the risk in accordance with specified, absolute risk 
criteria,” but instead, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has focused on 
ranking relative risk and ignoring absolute risk mitigation.42 Using case studies, they 
argue that although there is political pressure to respond to terrorist acts and overreacting 
is the general response, circumventing overreaction is the most cost-effective act to take. 
If another devastating event were to occur, the U.S. government needs to enhance its 
procedures and tactics, and not overstretch itself in the name of security. 43 
E. METHODS AND SOURCES 
This thesis will use process tracing, return on investment analysis, and deductive 
analysis to study the cost and effectiveness of the U.S.-Mexico border security. 
Government documents, reports, and directives will be used to trace the growth of the 
southern border’s budgets and manpower statistics from the creation of the Department of 
Homeland Security up to 2012. These will be used to establish the baseline of analysis of 
border security. Lacking reliable data on the number of successful illegal immigrants in a 
                                                 
40 Howard Kunreuther, “Risk Analysis and Risk Management in an Uncertain World,” Risk Analysis 
22, no 4 (2002): 662. 
41 Ibid., 663. 
42 National Research Council of the National Academies, Review of the Department of Homeland 
Security’s Approach to Risk Analysis (Washington, DC: National Academies Press, 2010), 137. 
43 John Mueller and Mark Stewart, “Balancing the Risks, Benefits, and Costs of Homeland Security,” 
Homeland Security Affairs 7, no 16 (2011): 1–2, 17–19. 
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given year will make it more difficult to measure the infiltration directly. However, the 
apprehension statistics from the U.S. Border Patrol will be used to determine benefits. 
This thesis argument will rely mostly on U.S. government sources pertaining to defensive 
barriers, illegal immigration, border security, and statistical data.  
F. THESIS OVERVIEW 
This thesis is organized into four main chapters to logically answer the proposed 
research questions. Chapter I is an overview of the thesis. Chapter II introduces the 
construction and expansion of the U.S.-Mexico defense barriers. It also reviews the 
border protection effectiveness by examining the increase in manpower and budget, DHS 
measures of effectiveness, and the effects and costs of present border security efforts. 
Chapter III outlines unintended consequences such as: unauthorized immigrants, threats 
of drug organizations and how DTOs can adapt to overcome barriers. These previous 
chapters will build the foundations for Chapter IV, which will answer the presented 
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II. DEFENSIVE BARRIERS, BORDER AGENTS, AND ILLEGAL 
IMMIGRATION 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The United States and Mexico share an almost 2,000-mile border; it is a 
geographic boundary and the legal jurisdiction territory of both nations. Citizenship and 
national sovereignty are defined by borders.44 The border is both a natural boundary that 
partially follows the path of the Rio Grande River (Figure 1) and an arbitrary man-made 
“line in the sand” boundary. The majority of this border is desolate and rugged landscape 
that is susceptible to dangerous climate conditions. Historically, the southern border is 
known for drug smuggling and illegal entry.45 Officially, there are 24 ports of entry 
shared between the four U.S. border states of Texas, California, New Mexico, and 
Arizona.46 A “port of entry” is a specifically chosen area where Customs and Border 
Patrol (CBP) agents “accept entries of merchandise, clear passengers, collect duties, and 
enforce the various provisions of CBP and related laws.”47 The traditional problems 
along the southern border have been related to arms trafficking, drug violence, illegal 
entry, and drug smuggling and challenges continue to affect U.S. border security. 
According to the U.S. Customs and Border Patrol (CBP), the border is where terrorism, 
drug trafficking, and smuggling meet, but it is currently still unknown for terrorist 
activity.48 The combination of rugged terrain, open areas, coastal waters, and rivers 
provide the perfect conditions for illegal activities. Prior to September 11, 2001, these 
challenges were handled by individual agencies.  
                                                 
44 Daniel M. Smith, The American Diplomatic Experience (Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin Company, 
1972), 130; Judith A. Warner, U.S. Border Security: A Reference Handbook (Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-
CLIO, 2010), 1. 
45 Warner, U.S. Border Security, 2. 
46 Warner, U.S. Border Security, 2; U.S. Customs and Border Protection, “Locate a Port of Entry,” 
accessed December 10, 2013, http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/toolbox/contacts/ports/. 
47 U.S. Customs and Border Protection, “Ports of Entry and User Fee Airports,” accessed October 19, 
2013, http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/toolbox/contacts/ports/. 
48 U.S. Customs and Border Protection, Secure Borders, Safe Travel, Legal Trade: U.S. Customs and 
Border Protection Fiscal Year 2009–2014 Strategic Plan (Washington, DC: U.S. Customs and Border 
Protection, 2009), 9.  
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Figure 1.  U.S.-Mexico border with sister cities49 
After 9/11, Department of Homeland Security (DHS) was created by the 
Homeland Security Act of 2002. This law reorganized federal government organizations 
by collapsing and combining existing agencies and creating of new agencies under the 
one umbrella of the DHS and thereby reducing fragmentation.50 The Customs and Border 
Protection (CBP) is an example of this reorganization; it was established by consolidating 
22 agencies into one organization. Agencies such as the U.S. Customs Service, U.S. 
Border Patrol and others were merged to form the CBP. The Border Patrol’s primary 
mission is to protect the United States by reducing the possibility that dangerous people 
and capabilities enter the nation between the ports of entry.51 The U.S. has attempted to 
fortify its defenses on the border in order to prevent drug trafficking and migration.52  
                                                 
49 “In 2010 California-Mexico Border Saw 93 Million Inspections, 90 Tons of Drugs and 41,000 
Apprehensions,” Latino Daily News, February 24, 2011, www.hispanicallyspeakingnews.com/latino-daily-
news/details/in-2010-california-mexico-border-saw-93-million-inspections-90-tons-of/5544.  
50 Warner, U.S. Border Security, 28.  
51 U.S. Customs and Border Protection, “CBP Mission Statement,” accessed November 11, 2013, 
http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/about/mission/guardians.xml. 
52 Warner, U.S. Border Security, 10. 
 15
The four U.S. border states are divided into nine different sections (see Figure 
2).53 Comprising these section are various border stations. Despite being the smallest 
section of border, San Diego was the busiest area in the 1990s for illegal immigration and 
most of the apprehensions occurred in this area of the southern border. It is argued by 
border fence advocates that the security measures put in place in during this time period 
were effective. Using the success of the 1990s, the federal government again turned to 
these defensive measures in the following decade to continue safeguarding the U.S.-
Mexico border. Yet, a closer analysis is essential to determine if these updated type of 
defensive barriers are successful; specifically, what methods are responsible for the 
decrease in illegal immigration and why. This chapter will analyze the utilization and 
effectiveness of specific defensive measures along the U.S.-Mexico border. This will 
include security measures such as assembling fences and the increase in U.S. Border 
Patrol (USBP) personnel from 2001 to 2012. 
 
 
Figure 2.  Southwest Border Patrol sections.54 
                                                 
53 Richard M. Stana, Secure Border Initiative: Observation on the Importance of Applying Lessons 
Learned to Future Projects (Washington DC: Congressional Research Service, 2008), 4. 
54 U.S. Army Corp of Engineers, Engineering and Construction Support Office, “Office of Border 
Patrol—Sectors and Stations,” January 18, 2014, http://ecso.swf.usace.army.mil/maps/SectorP.pdf. 
Big Bend
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There is a lack of reliable and accurate data on the exact number of illegal 
immigrants that successfully enter into the United States every year. This means that 
there is no way of directly measuring illegal immigration into the United States. 
Apprehensions are currently based only on the number of attempted illegal entries 
captured each fiscal year, and these numbers are skewed. This data does not take into 
account repeat offenders, and illegal migrants are known to try and cross the border 
multiple times. Therefore, these occurrences are included into the total reported 
apprehension statistics and are not a true reflection of the actual number of people 
caught.55 This also means that the success rate cannot be calculated accurately, due to the 
unknown exact number of annual illegal entries. The fluctuation in reported 
apprehensions can be interpreted in different ways. For example: 1) the rise in 
apprehensions could reflect a higher number of attempts by illegal immigrants and a 
standard success rate, or 2) an indication of a fixed number of illegal immigrants 
attempting entry and increased in success percentage in apprehensions due to security 
measures, like an increase in border agents, new technology, or new fence construction.  
On the other hand, a reduction could be construed differently. A decrease could 
indicate flawed USBP practices, such as agents accepting bribes or inadequate 
deployment of agents at the popular immigration routes. The decrease in the number of 
assigned agents, in certain border sectors, could be a possible reason for decreased 
apprehensions. Less agents means fewer people caught trying to cross the border. 
Moreover, the measure of success could also be incorrect. If the number of border agents 
is increasing and apprehensions decreasing, then something else could be affecting the 
numbers. There might be fewer attempts at crossing or illegal immigration might have 
shifted to a different area. This thesis will indirectly measure illegal immigration by using 
the annually reported USBP apprehension statistics. A decrease in apprehensions could 
mean that the security measures are a success. Even though these figures have 
limitations, it is still the best indicator to measure illegal immigration at this time, and 
this thesis will carefully utilize it.  
                                                 
55 Blas Nunez-Neto and Yule Kim, Border Security: Barriers along the U.S. International Border 
(Washington DC: Congressional Research Service, 2008), 11.  
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B. BUILDING DEFENSIVE BARRIER 
1. The 1990s Fencing Background 
The United States government has made progressive efforts to fortify and control 
its borders. Borders represent the boundaries of a nation’s authority and shape its area of 
control.56 The tactic of building defensive barriers along the southern border began in the 
1990s with several projects: Operation Gatekeeper, located in San Diego, California 
(CA); Hold the Line, in El Paso, Texas (TX); Operation Safeguard in Tucson, Arizona 
(AZ), and Operation Rio Grande, in McAllen, TX. All these programs were designed 
under the new strategy of “Prevention through Deterrence” to replace the former failing 
strategy. Fencing was built around urban settings to discourage and deter potential illegal 
immigration.57  
The San Diego sector is comprised of eight stations; the double layered fence 
extends over only two stations, Chula Vista and Imperial Beach.58 These two are the 
epicenter between San Diego’s estimated population of 1.1 million and Tijuana’s 
estimated population of 2.2 million people.59 Located in this area, San Ysidro, California 
is the busiest port of entry (POE). The strategy prior to 1990 was to apprehend illegal 
immigrants after they had crossed the border. This allowed many to escape capture if 
they were not chased.60 To increase their chances of a successful crossing, enormous 
groups of immigrants would assemble near the border and wait for the cover of night. 
Crowds ranging from hundreds to thousands would then run across the border and try to 
blend into the urban neighborhoods. The Border Patrol had countered this technique by 
                                                 
56 Warner, U.S. Border Security, 1.  
57 Ibid., 20. 
58 U.S. Customs and Border Protection, “Imperial Beach Station,” accessed November13, 2013, 
http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/border_security/border_patrol/border_patrol_sectors/sandiego_sector_ca/stati
ons/sandiego_imperial.xml. 
59 Joseph Nevins, Operation Gatekeeper: The Rise of the “Illegal Alien” and the Making of the U.S.-
Mexico Boundary (New York: Routledge, 2002), 80. 
60 U.S. Government Accounting Office, Border Control: Revised Strategy is Showing Some Positive 
Results (Washington DC: U.S. Government Accounting Office, 1994), 12.  
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responding with “one-on-one” man hunts, and for every eight migrants that crossed only 
one was apprehended during this time was a 1 in 8 average of people crossing.61  
This proved to be neither an effective nor an efficient strategy and created a 
demand for something new. Politicians determined that defensive barriers were needed 
for several reasons: to deter potential immigrants, give support to border patrol agents, 
and maintain the integrity of the border.62 The first fence, also known as the primary 
fence, around the city of San Diego, is the busiest known area for cross-border criminal 
activity, consisted of a 10 foot tall fence. The California National Guard and Corps of 
Engineers began building the fence in 1990 and completed construction in 1993. The 
barrier was assembled from steel sheets and extended from the Pacific Ocean 14 miles 
inland along the San Diego 66-mile southwest border. To improve both visibility during 
the night and increase the detection ability for the patrolling border agents along the high 
traffic zone, the fence was equipped with stadium lighting systems.63 In the Imperial 
Beach and Chula Vista stations, there was a decrease in the Border Patrol’s reported 
apprehension numbers and a noticeable increase in apprehension in the other San Diego 
stations during these early years.64 The Border Patrol attributed the success to the 
defensive barrier technique.65  
2. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act 
The Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) of 
1996 permitted the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) to build an additional 
layer behind the San Diego primary fence for reinforcement. In addition, it also granted 
permission for the Attorney General to construct border defensive barriers. Using the 
                                                 
61 Ibid., 11–12. 
62 Ibid. 
63 Blas Nunez-Neto and Stephen Vina, Border Security: Fences along the U.S. International Border 
(Washington DC: Congressional Research Service, 2008), 2.  
64 U.S. Customs and Border Protection, U.S. Border Patrol Fiscal Year 2012 Statistics: U.S. Border 






Sandia Laboratory’s recommendations, the building began in 1999. This additional fence 
was part of a multilayer fencing system that was recommended by the Government 
Accountability Office (GAO) to create numerous obstacles in urban settings to 
discourage illegal crossings, delay crossings, improve detection, and to funnel 
immigrants to other locations.66 This secondary three-layer fence is 150 feet away from 
the primary fence, 15 feet high, and consists of steel mesh to reduce the finger and toe 
holds of a would-be climber. The top of the fence is slanted inward towards the climber 
to increase the difficulty. In more congested areas, an additional third fence is present, a 
chain linked fence with barbed wire on top.67 An all-weather patrol road and lighting 
were installed between the two fences to assist any vehicles chasing those who scaled the 
primary wall.  
The California Coastal Commission’s (CCC) environmental concerns stopped the 
secondary fence after 9.5 miles were completed.68 In 2005, the REAL ID Act gave the 
Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) the power to override any 
legal obligations in order to finish the construction of the defensive barriers.69  
3. Fence Act, 2006  
On October 26, 2006, the Secure Fence Act was signed into law by President 
George W. Bush, which enabled DHS to build additional fortifications along the southern 
border. Two-layered fencing, cameras, lighting, roads, and sensors were some of the 
additional items added along five areas of the border. The areas to be fenced in were 
Brownsville, TX, to Laredo, TX; Eagle Pass, TX, to Del Rio, TX; El Paso, TX, to 
Columbus, New Mexico (NM); Douglas, AZ, to Calexico, CA, and 20 miles around 
                                                 
66 U.S. Government Accounting Office, Border Control: Revised Strategy, 13; Peter Andreas, Border 
Games (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2000), 91. 
67 Ted Robbins, “Q&A Building a Barrier along the Border with Mexico,” National Public Radio, 
April 2006, http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=5326083. 
68 Chad Haddal, Yule Kim, and Michael Garcia, Border Security: Barriers along the U.S. 
International Border (Washington DC: Congressional Research Service, 2009), 
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/RL33659.pdf, 1. 
69 Ibid., 1–2, 5. 
 20
Tecata, CA, equating to roughly 850 miles of fencing.70 The 2008 Consolidated 
Appropriations Act revised the Fence Act, stating that “not fewer than 700 miles of the 
southwest border, in locations where fencing is deemed more practical and effective.”71 
The CBP website currently reports that as of February 10, 2012, it has completed a total 
of 651 miles of fence along the southern border. Of these 651 miles, 352 miles are 
composed of pedestrian fence (for urban areas), and 299 miles are vehicle fence (used 
more away from urban areas).72   
C. THE SOUTHERN BORDER: APPREHENSIONS, AGENTS, AND RISING 
COSTS 
1. Apprehensions 
a. Unauthorized Immigrants 
The nation’s trepidation over unauthorized immigration has made immigration a 
major issue in the political arena. In response to voter’s concerns, politicians have 
increased the number of Border Patrol agents and installed new surveillance equipment.73 
The act of crossing the country’s border lacking permission constitutes a criminal 
offense, and people who try are then labeled “illegal aliens” or “criminal aliens” by the 
media. The government uses the term “unauthorized immigrants.”74 Once captured, the 
unauthorized immigrants are deported. The latest stage of criminalizing immigration was 
the 2001 USA PATRIOT Act. This authorizes permission to deport or detain any 
noncitizen without due process if they present a danger to national security.75 
Traditionally, the United States has depended on apprehending these migrants at the 
                                                 
70 Ibid., 9. 
71 Ibid., 2. 
72 U.S. Customs and Border Protection, “Southwest Border Fence Construction Progress,” February 
10, 2012, http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/border_security/ti/ti_news/sbi_fence/. 
73 Jason. Ackleson and Josiah Heyman, “United States Border Security after 9/11,” in Border Security 
in the Al-Qaeda Era, ed. John A. Winterdyk and Kelly W. Sunberg (London: CRC Press 2010), 42–44.  
74 Warner, U.S. Border Security, 20. 
75 David Cole, Enemy Aliens: Double Standards and Constitutional Freedoms in the War on 
Terrorism (New York: Free Press 2003), 50–51. 
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U.S.-Mexican border verses arresting them within the interior of the country.76 The 
southern border constitutes the majority of apprehensions 97 to 98 percent.77 
b. Data Analysis 
In general, the statistics reported by the CBP have demonstrated a decreasing 
percentage of apprehensions from fiscal year (FY) 2001 to FY 2012 (see Table 1)—
basically fewer people were being caught.78 Figure 3, provided by the Economist, shows 
a visual representation of the difference in apprehensions from 2000 to 2012. Total 
apprehensions fell by more than 70 percent from FY2001 (with over 1.2 million) to FY 
2012 (with 356,873).79 The most abrupt decline transpired between 2008 and 2011 when 
apprehensions fell to 53 percent.80 This coincided with the beginning of fencing 
construction dictated by the Secure Fence Act of 2006. It is difficult to calculate how 
effective the fence has been in the 2000s because previously mentioned programs were 
put into place during this time. These programs increased resources across the border, 
specifically increasing border patrol agents and adding additional equipment to tighten 
the border. The increase in law enforcement agents has improved the human barrier 
aspect that coincided with the physical defensive barrier, and the additional equipment 
has increased the possibility of detecting intrusions.  
                                                 
76 Warner, U.S. Border Security, 64. 
77 Global Security, “U.S.-Mexico Border Fence ‘Great Wall of Mexico,’” accessed 10 December 
2013, http://www.globalsecurity.org/security/systems/mexico-wall.htm.  
78 Fiscal year (FY) is the accounting period for the federal government. It begins on October 1 and 
ends on September 30. For example fiscal year 2006 begins October 1, 2005 and ends September 20, 2006. 
The Secure Fence Act signed October 29, 2006; apprehensions are reported for FY 2007. U.S. Senate, 
“U.S. Senate Glossary,” accessed January 18, 2014, 
http://www.senate.gov/reference/glossary_term/fiscal_year.htm.  
79 Immigration System: Opportunities for Legal Immigration and Enforcement of Laws against Illegal 
Immigration before the Committee of the Judiciary, U.S. House of Representatives, 113th Cong., (2013) 
(testimony of Muzaffar Chishti), 
http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/113th/02052013/Chishti%2002052013.pdf. 
80 Ibid.; U.S. Customs and Border Protection, “CBP’s 2011 Fiscal Year in Review,” December 12, 




Figure 3.  U.S. Border Patrol sectors difference in apprehension numbers of 
2000 and 2012.81  
 
  
Table 1.  Southwest border apprehensions by fiscal year82 
                                                 
81 “U.S.-Mexico Border: Secure Enough,” Economist, June 22, 2013, 
www.economist.com/news/united-states/21579828-spending-billions-more-fences-and-drones-will-do-
more-harm-good-secure-enough.  
82 U.S. Customs and Border Protection, “Total Illegal Alien Apprehensions by Fiscal Year,” accessed 
August 02, 2013, 
http://www.cbp.gov/sites/default/files/documents/U.S.%20Border%20Patrol%20Fiscal%20Year%20Appre
hension%20Statistics%20by%20sector%20and%20border%20area.pdf. 
FY2001 FY2002 FY2003 FY2004 FY2005 FY2006 FY2007 FY2008 FY2009 FY2010 FY2011 FY2012
Big Bend 12087 11392 10319 10530 10536 7520 5536 5391 6360 5288 4036 3964
Del Rio 104875 66985 50145 53794 68506 42636 22920 20761 17082 14694 16144 21720
El Centro 172852 108273 92099 74467 55722 61465 55883 40961 33521 32562 30191 23916
El Paso 112857 94154 88816 104399 122679 122256 75464 30312 14999 12251 10345 9678
Laredo 87068 82095 70521 74706 75346 74840 56714 43658 40569 35287 36053 44872
Rio Grande Valley 107844 89927 77749 92947 134186 110528 73430 75473 60989 59766 59243 97762
San Diego 110075 100681 111515 138608 126904 142104 152460 162390 118721 68565 42447 28461
Tucson 449675 333648 347263 491771 439079 392074 378239 317696 241673 212202 123285 120000
Yuma 78385 42654 56638 98060 138438 118549 37992 8363 6951 7116 5833 6500




Analyzing the statistics reported by the Border Patrol demonstrates that for FY 
2006, before the Secure Fence Act was passed, the number of apprehensions were 
already dropping (a shown in Table 1).83 Apprehensions continued to decline after it was 
signed into law during FY2007 (see Table 2). Furthermore, these decreases are seen in 
areas that were without defensive barriers. In other words, Border Patrol’s strategy for 
stopping undocumented migrants was successful in areas without any fencing. The Del 
Rio, TX, sector had a 66.5 percent decrease. The number of arrests declined 45.3 percent 
in Rio Grande Valley, TX; these were the lowest apprehension statistics in 15 years.84 
Prior to 2008, neither of these sectors had any type of defensive barrier.85 In Tucson, AZ, 
fencing was installed soon after the passing of the Secure Fence Act, yet the reductions 
had begun before the fencing was constructed. From FY 2006 to FY 2011, apprehensions 
in Tucson decreased by 68 percent.86 During this same time, it is estimated that illegal 
entries decreased by 69 percent.87 By analyzing the apprehension data, the change in 
migration flow can be seen after observing which sector had noticeable differences in 
apprehensions reported.  
The Border Patrol officials have several reasons to explain why the decrease is a 
success. First, manpower from FY 2006 to FY 2011 increased from 2,600 to 4,200 border 
patrol agents in Tucson sector.88 Second, Operation Jump Start supplemented 9,000 
National Guard service members from June 2006 to July 2008.89 Third, the Secure 
Border Initiative (SBI) allowed CBP to spend roughly $850 million on improving 
surveillance and other technology. Finally, the installation of pedestrian and vehicle 
                                                 
83 Secure Fence Act was signed October 26, 2006, which fell within fiscal year 2007.  
84 “Fencing the Border,” New York Times, May 21, 2008, 
http://www.nytimes.com/imagepages/2008/05/21/us/21fencegraphic.ready.html. 
85 Ibid. 
86 U.S. Government Accounting Office [GAO], Border Patrol: Key Elements of New Strategic Plan 
Not Yet in Place to Inform Border Security Status and Resource Needs (Washington DC: U.S. Government 
Accounting Office, 2012), www.gao.gov/assets/660/650730.pdf, 11–12. 
87 Ibid. 
88 Ibid., 13. 
89 Ibid. 
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fencing along the border also contributed to the decline.90 During this same time, the 
areas that had demonstrated an increase in apprehensions were El Centro and San Diego 
in California. As previously mentioned, these areas have had reinforced defensive 
fencing for over a decade. San Diego is one of the most fortified areas with its triple 
fencing. While apprehensions in other unfenced areas were decreasing, San Diego 
experienced a 20.1 percent increase.91  
 
 
Table 2.  Apprehensions by year and sector and articulated as a 
percentage of the whole Southwest total92 
2. BORDER AGENTS AND BUDGETS 
A report by the Migration Policy Institute (MPI) reveals that the volume of the 
United States immigration enforcement is at an all-time high.93 Spending by both CBP 
and U.S. immigrations and Customs Enforcement (ICE), the government’s two main 
immigration enforcement institutions, and the U.S.-VISIT program immigration 
                                                 
90 Ibid., 12. 
91 “Fencing the Border,” New York Times. 
92 U.S. Customs and Border Protection, “Southwest Border Sectors: Total Illegal Apprehensions by 
Fiscal Year,” accessed November 12, 2013, 
http://www.cbp.gov/sites/default/files/documents/U.S.%20Border%20Patrol%20Fiscal%20Year%20Appre
hension%20Statistics%201960-2013_0.pdf. 
93 Doris Meissner, Donald M. Kervin, Muzaffar Chishti, and Claire Bergeron, Immigration 
Enforcement in the United States: The Rise of a Formidable Machinery (Washington DC: Migration Policy 
Institute, 2013), 9. 
Sector FY2001 FY2002 FY2003 FY2004 FY2005 FY2006 FY2007 FY2008 FY2009 FY2010 FY2011 FY2012
Big Bend 1.0% 1.2% 1.1% 0.9% 0.9% 0.7% 0.6% 0.8% 1.2% 1.2% 1.2% 1.1%
Del Rio 8.5% 7.2% 5.5% 4.7% 5.8% 4.0% 2.7% 2.9% 3.2% 3.3% 4.9% 6.1%
El Centro 14.0% 11.6% 10.2% 6.5% 4.8% 5.7% 6.5% 5.8% 6.2% 7.3% 9.2% 6.7%
El Paso 9.1% 10.1% 9.8% 9.2% 10.5% 11.4% 8.8% 4.3% 2.8% 2.7% 3.2% 2.7%
Laredo 7.0% 8.8% 7.8% 6.6% 6.4% 7.0% 6.6% 6.2% 7.5% 7.9% 11.0% 12.6%
Rio Grande Valley 8.7% 9.7% 8.6% 8.2% 11.5% 10.3% 8.6% 10.7% 11.3% 13.3% 18.1% 27.4%
San Diego 8.9% 10.8% 12.3% 12.2% 10.8% 13.3% 17.8% 23.0% 22.0% 15.3% 13.0% 8.0%
Tucson 36.4% 35.9% 38.4% 43.2% 37.5% 36.6% 44.1% 45.1% 44.7% 47.4% 37.6% 33.6%




technology enforcement initiative reached a combined budget of 17.9 billion in FY 
2012.94 Compared to the former Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), this is 15 
times more than the INS’s 1986 budget. This was also a 24 percent increase over 
combined 2012 fiscal budgets of other federal law enforcement institutions: Drug 
Enforcement Administration (DEA), Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI), Bureau of 
Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF), U.S. Marshals Service, and the Secret 
Service.95 
The number of border patrol agents has grown increasingly larger from FY 1992 
to FY 2012: a 518 percent increase and an increase of 17,305 border agents over two 
decades.96 A large increase occurred from FY 2007 to FY 2011 with the majority of 
personnel stationed on the U.S.-Mexico border (see Table 3). In FY 2001, the number of 
agents on the southern border numbered at 9,147 out of the national total of 9,821. This 
number has more than doubled by FY 2012 with 18,546 of the 21,394 agents located on 
the southwest border sectors (see Table 4).97 The FY 2012 statistics were five times the 
number of border agents in 1993. This is an 87 percent increase in growth, and it is one of 
the government’s fastest-growing institutions.98  
                                                 
94 Ibid., 21. 
95 Immigration System: Opportunities for Legal Immigration and Enforcement of Laws against Illegal 
Immigration before the Committee of the Judiciary, U.S. House of Representatives, 113th Cong., 1, (2013) 
(testimony of Muzaffar Chishti), 
http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/113th/02052013/Chishti%2002052013.pdf. 
96 Erik Lee and Eric L. Olson, The State of Security in the U.S.-Mexico Border Region (Washington 
DC: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 2013), 111. 
97 The Southern Border Sectors include Yuma, San Diego, Rio Grande Valley (McAllen), Laredo, El 
Paso, El Centro, Del Rio, Big Bend (Marfa), and as of FY 2010, the Special Operations Group. U.S. 







Table 3.  U.S. Border on the Southwest border99 
 
 
Table 4.  USBP staffing compared to national total100 
Increases in both USBP personnel and the USBP budget have grown rapidly since 
the creation of CBP under DHS. Between FY 2005 to FY 2012, CBP funding had 
increased from $6.3 billion to $11.7 billion.101 This was roughly a $5.4 billion, or 85 
percent, increase.102 As the CBP funding has skyrocketed, so too has the Border Patrol’s. 
In this time, the Border Patrol funding has more than doubled from over $1.5 billion to 
                                                 
99 Ibid. 
100 Ibid. 
101 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, FY 2013 Budget in Brief (Washington, DC: U.S. 
Department of Homeland Security, 2012), www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/mgmt/dhs-budget-in-brief-
fy2013.pdf, 6, 25; U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Budget in Brief FY 2007, 
www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/mgmt/dhs-budget-in-brief-fy2007.pdf, 17. 
102 Doris Meissner, Donald M. Kervin, Muzaffar Chishti, and Claire Bergeron, Immigration 
Enforcement in the United States: The Rise of a Formidable Machinery (Washington, DC: Migration 
Policy Institute, 2013) 18, www.migrationpolicy.org/pubs/enforcementpillars.pdf. 
SECTOR FY2001 FY2002 FY2003 FY2004 FY2005 FY2006 FY2007 FY2008 FY2009 FY2010 FY2011 FY2012
Big Bend 194 253 230 239 220 246 336 421 682 672 667 693
Del Rio 893 972 950 933 907 935 1138 1427 1682 1650 1626 1655
El Centro 589 683 755 743 684 713 894 1080 1187 1181 1164 1168
El Paso 1086 1122 1188 1094 1330 1741 2251 2506 2712 2752 2738 2718
Laredo 921 969 1025 981 937 926 1206 1636 1863 1858 1871 1879
Rio Grande Valley 1451 1484 1524 1439 1380 1431 1822 2063 2422 2441 2504 2546
San Diego 2004 1807 1972 1651 1562 1671 2019 2328 2570 2594 2669 2623
Tucson 1686 1626 1838 2104 2324 2595 2806 3049 3318 3353 4239 4176
Yuma 323 323 358 331 547 774 825 932 972 987 969 954
Total 9147 9239 9840 9515 9891 11032 13297 15442 17408 17488 18447 18412
United States Border Patrol Agents on the Southwest Border 
Data taken from USBP.
Fiscal FY2001 FY2002 FY2003 FY2004 FY2005 FY2006 FY2007 FY2008 FY2009 FY2010 FY2011 FY2012
Southwest Border Sectors 9147 9239 9840 9506 9891 11032 13297 15442 17408 17535 18506 18546




more than $3.5 billion (see Figure 4). In 11 years, the USBP budget has tripled from $1.1 
billion to $3.5 billion (see Table 5). These amounts include annual and supplemental 
funds requested by both Presidents Bush and Obama.  
The information depicted in Table 5 is a reflection of the “Border Security 
Inspections and Trade Facilitation between POE’s,” for 2004–2012 when INS and USBP 
were combined to form CBP, and the budget statistics from 2001–2003 are as reported by 
the USBP.103 The USBP data is only a portion of the CBP expenses and salaries within 
the DHS annual appropriations.104 These numbers exclude: Border Security Inspections 
and Trade Facilitation at POE’s ($2.9 billion in FY 2012), Headquarters Management and 
Administration ($1.9 billion), and other CBP funded programs: Air and Marine 
Interdiction, Operation, Maintenance, and Procurement ($504 million), Border Security 
Fencing, Infrastructure, and Technology ($400 million), and Automation Modernization 
($334 million).105 Also, it should be noted that Table 5 does not include U.S. 
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) funding that equaled roughly $5.5 billion 
in expenditures and salaries in FY 2012 or any other federal agencies that are often 
involved with border security.106 Basically, this data portrays only the USBP’s operating 
costs.  
                                                 
103 Marc R. Rosenblum, Border Security: Immigration Enforcement between Ports of Entry 
(Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2013), 13. 
104 Ibid., 12 
105 William L. Painter, DHS: FY2013 Appropriations (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of 
Homeland Security, 2012), 33; U.S. Department of Homeland Security [DHS], FY 2012 Budget in Brief 
(Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2012), 70.  
106 DHS, FY 2012 Budget in Brief, 83. 
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Figure 4.  USBP budget growth 
 
Table 5.  USBP budget from FY2001–FY2012107 
                                                 
107 U.S. Customs and Border Protection, “Enacted Border Patrol Program Budget by Fiscal Year,” 


















3. Raising the Cost for Fencing and Apprehensions 
a. Cost of the Fence 
Enforcing America’s defensive barrier has a tremendous price tag attached to it, 
and that price tag has changed over time. In 2006, the Congressional Budget Office 
(CBO) projected that the border fence would cost $3 million a mile to build and 15 
percent of the total cost to maintain it; however, the CBO did not specify what it used to 
estimate costs.108 By September 30, 2007, almost 73 miles of fencing were completed at 
a cost of roughly $198 million.109 CBP completed two miles of vehicle fencing cost $2.8 
million, and one mile of secondary pedestrian fence for around $3 million.110 The 
remaining 70 miles consisted of pedestrian type fencing cost $194 million, which 
averaged from $400,000 to $4.8 million per mile.111 By October 31, 2008, 215 miles of 
fencing had been finished costing almost $625 million.112 This includes $214 million 
spent on completing 75 miles of pedestrian fence, $334 million on secondary fencing, 
and $78 million on vehicle fencing.113 From FY 2006 to FY 2009, almost $3.6 billion 
was spent on building 299 miles of vehicle fence and 352 pedestrian type fences.114 At 
the end of FY 2010, DHS stated that, since FY 2006, approximately $4.4 billion was 
invested in border fencing, lighting, and technology.115  
                                                 
108 Mark Grabowicz and Sunita D’Monte, Congressional Budget Office Cost Estimate: 
Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act of 2006 (Washington, DC: Congressional Budget Office, 2006), 
14. 
109 Richard M. Stana, Secure Border Initiative Fence Construction Costs (Washington DC: U.S. 
Government Accountability Office, 2009), 3. 
110 Ibid. 
111 Ibid., 7. 
112 Ibid., 8. 
113 Ibid.  
114 Global Security, “U.S.-Mexico Border Fence,” accessed 10 December 2013, 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/security/systems/mexico-wall.htm. 
115 Richard M. Stana, DHS Progress and Challenges in Securing the U.S. Southwest and Northern 
Borders (Washington DC: U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2011), 1. 
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b. Apprehensions and Cost per Agent 
Another observation is that as more resources are integrated into the southern 
border (money, personnel, technology, etc.) coupled with the decreasing migration, it 
may result in more assets used in an attempt to tackle a smaller problem. Basically, as 
more and more is invested into the border (e.g., money, personnel), it is yielding fewer 
and fewer results, which creates un-proportional result that equates to diminish returns. 
With the decrease in apprehensions, it means that the ratio of apprehensions to border 
patrol agents is decreasing. In other words, with more law enforcement, there are fewer 
people being caught, and the associated cost will continue to increase. The price of 
sustaining border controls could become unrealistic to maintain, despite successful 
deterrence reflected by lower apprehension numbers.  
This ratio is different for every section because personnel distribution is not even. 
According to a report by the Washington Office of Latin America, the average number of 
apprehensions by the Border Patrol was over 300 migrants a year in the 1990s.116 This 
number has been dramatically reduced to the lowest average of apprehensions in 2011 (at 
18) and the second lowest in 2012 (at 19) (see Table 6). During this same years, El Paso 
averaged 4 and San Diego 16 (2011) and 11 (2012), and both of these were under the 
national average (see Table 7).117 In addition, for every unauthorized immigrant 







                                                 
116 Isacson and Meyer, Beyond the Border Buildup, 32. 
117 Ibid.  
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As financing has amplified, the ratio of money to apprehensions has also changed. 
The cost in FY2012 was just fewer than 10 thousand dollars per arrest, and the price tag 
is 10 times more than in FY2001, which was almost one thousand dollars per person. 
Using the historical average inflation rate of three percent per year, an inflation-
adjustment assessment can be made for FY2014.118 This approximation would be 
roughly $10,500 per arrest. Applying Oregon State University’s calculated inflation rate 
of 2.05 for 2014, the estimated cost would be $10,100 per person.119 Regardless of which 
estimate is utilized, the exact number will be unknown until all data is collected for FY 
2014. The cost should remain in the five digit figures as money and personal are still 
allocated to border security. Regardless, this is an ineffective and inefficient way of 
spending money. It would appear that the cost-per-apprehension is rising and creating a 
diminishing return. The definition of diminishing return is that if one factor of production 
(number of workers, for example) is increased while other factors (machines and 
workspace, for example) are held constant or decreased, the output per unit of the 
variable factor will eventually diminish. Or “the gain is not worth the pain.”120  
 
                                                 
118 City of Lincoln, “Calculating Inflation Factors for Cost Estimates,” accessed February 15, 2014, 
http://lincoln.ne.gov/city/pworks/engine/dconst/gpp/pdf/inflation.pdf. 
119 Robert Sahr, “Consumer Price Index Conversion Factors to Convert to 2012 Dollars,” Oregon 
State University, accessed February 15, 2014, http://oregonstate.edu/cla/polisci/sahr/sahr. 
120 Dictionary.com, s.v.,“Diminishing Returns,” accessed: January 05, 2014, 
http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/diminishing returns.  
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Table 6.  Southwest average apprehensions per border agent121 
 
Table 7.  Average number of apprehensions along the 
Southwestern border by sector122 
                                                 
121 U.S. Customs and Border Protection, “Total Illegal Alien Apprehensions by Fiscal Year,” accessed 
August 02, 2013, 
http://www.cbp.gov/sites/default/files/documents/U.S.%20Border%20Patrol%20Fiscal%20Year%20Appre
hension%20Statistics%20by%20sector%20and%20border%20area.pdf; U.S. Border Patrol, “Border Patrol 
Agents Staffing By Fiscal Year,” accessed November 16, 2013, 
http://www.cbp.gov/sites/default/files/documents/U.S.%20Border%20Patrol%20Fiscal%20Year%20Staffin
g%20Statistics%201992-2013.pdf. 
122 U.S. Customs and Border Protection, “Total Illegal Alien Apprehensions by Fiscal Year;” U.S. 
Border Patrol, “Border Patrol Agents Staffing By Fiscal Year.” 
Fiscal Year 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Southwest Border Staff 9147 9239 9840 9506 9891 11032 13297 15442 17408 17535 18506 18546
Apprehensions 1235718 929809 905065 1139282 1171396 1071972 858638 705005 540865 447731 327577 356873
Average 135 101 92 120 118 97 65 46 31 26 18 19
Apprehensions per Border Agent
SECTOR FY2001 FY2002 FY2003 FY2004 FY2005 FY2006 FY2007 FY2008 FY2009 FY2010 FY2011 FY2012
Big Bend 62 45 45 44 48 31 16 13 9 8 6 6
Del Rio 117 69 53 58 76 46 20 15 10 9 10 13
El Centro 293 159 122 100 81 86 63 38 28 28 26 20
El Paso 104 84 75 95 92 70 34 12 6 4 4 4
Laredo 95 85 69 76 80 81 47 27 22 19 19 24
Rio Grande Valley 74 61 51 65 97 77 40 37 25 24 24 38
San Diego 55 56 57 84 81 85 76 70 46 26 16 11
Tucson 267 205 189 234 189 151 135 104 73 63 29 29





Table 8.  Average cost of apprehensions per unauthorized immigrant123 
D. CONCLUSION 
The 1,954-mile stretch of the U.S.-Mexico border area is a massive geographic 
region, and the majority of it in mountainous and dangerous isolated desert type terrain. It 
represents a gigantic challenge to both countries to manage the space. The United States 
has responded to this complex security puzzle with defensive barriers and increased 
manning and financial support. With the 69 percent decrease in illegal entries from 
FY2006 to FY2011, it is uncertain whether the defensive barriers are paying off.124  
With the additional staffing and fence length, it can be suggested that the fencing 
did contribute in deterring illegal migration and pushing the flow eastward, however, to 
what extent is unknown.125 It can be argued that it is the overlap of the human factor and 
                                                 
123 U.S. Customs and Border Protection, “Enacted Border Patrol Program Budget by Fiscal Year,” 
accessed November 12, 2013, 
http://www.cbp.gov/sites/default/files/documents/BP%20Budget%20History%201990-2013.pdf; U.S. 
Border Patrol, “Total Illegal Alien Apprehensions by Fiscal Year.” 
124 Tracy Conner, “Price Tag for 700 Miles of Border Fencing: High and Hard to Pin Down,” NBC 
News, January 15, 2014, http://usnews.nbc.news.com.  
125 Chad Haddal, Yule Kim, and Michael Garcia, Border Security: Barriers along the U.S. 
International Border (Washington DC: Congressional Research Service, 2009), 11, 13. 
Fiscal Year Budget (in Thousands) Apprehensions Average Cost
FY2001 $1,146,463 1235718 $927.77
FY2002 $1,416,251 929809 $1,523.16
FY2003 $1,515,080 905065 $1,674.00
FY2004 $1,409,480 1139282 $1,237.17
FY2005 $1,524,960 1171396 $1,301.83
FY2006 $2,115,268 1071972 $1,973.25
FY2007 $2,277,510 858638 $2,652.47
FY2008 $2,245,261 705005 $3,184.74
FY2009 $2,656,055 540865 $4,910.75
FY2010 $2,958,108 447731 $6,606.89
FY2011 $3,549,295 327577 $10,834.99




the defensive barriers have tightened the border. The constructed fencing around urban 
areas has assisted in diverting illegal migrants to more deserted areas, where law 
enforcement agents have an advantage in catching the potential border crossers. Though 
migration patterns are anything but predictable in general, it would appear that the United 
States has already reached and arguably surpassed the point of diminishing returns in 
regard to border security. If the current trends continue on their present path, any more 
increases in the border security could result in even smaller returns of investment. 
Current statistics demonstration on the southern border one border agent averages less 
than 20 apprehensions at a cost of roughly $10,000 each; that is a $200,000 average 
annual price tag for one border agent effort. On the surface, it does appear that the 
security measures are working, but the costs associated with this security blanket are 
high. History shows that as long as the government stays on its current path, the price will 
only continue to increase. This concern raises the issue that the U.S. needs to look for 
better cost-effective alternative solutions and include possible options that are focused 







III. DEFENSIVE BARRIERS AND UNINTENDED 
CONSEQUENCES 
A. INTRODUCTION 
On May 10, 2011, in a speech about immigration in El Paso, President Barack 
Obama stated, “the (border) fence is now basically complete.”126 The president is 
referring to the fact that 649 miles of the 652 miles mandated by Congress are 
completed.127 The CBP claims that it operationally controls 874 miles, and of this, 129 
miles is under full control while the rest are considered “managed.”128 In reality, the 
1,969 mile long border only has 651 miles fenced in.129 The majority of completed 
fencing consists of vehicle barriers, barbed-wire, and inadequate provisions to effectively 
prevent or detour anyone determined to cross illegally. Thus, the border is still porous 
and open in remote environments, which are equipped with less sophisticated defensive 
barriers.130 One would think a meticulously fabricated fence should have deterrence 
properties to adequately effect both illegal smuggling and unauthorized immigration 
activity. However, people are creative and adaptive. A determined person will find holes 
in any system including cutting and climbing over, going around, or even under a 
barricade. The barrier is a stationary object and cannot physically respond or do anything 
other than just be if a determined individual wants to infiltrate the United States. Even if 
                                                 
126 Jake Tapper and Jason Ryan, “Fact Check Desk: President Obama’s Speech on Immigration 
Reform,” ABC News, May 10, 2011, http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/politics/2011/05/from-the-fact-check-
desk-president-obamas-speech-on-immigration-reform/. 
127 Richard Stana, Border Security: Preliminary Observations on Border Control Measures for the 
Southwest Border (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2011). 
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129 Byran Roberts, Edward Alden, and John Whitley, “Managing Illegal Immigration to the United 
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the fence is equipped with sensors and cameras, which have limitations, it is still unable 
to prevent a penetration, only alert authorities and possibly slow the person down.131  
Despite the hype about the effectiveness of border defenses, there are still 
negative side-effects associated with border security. Border fences have been labeled the 
cause of migrant deaths, injuries, and increased human rights violations. According to an 
article in Business Week: 
“Border fences don’t keep people out—they just slow them down,” muses 
Jesús Rodríguez, a 15-year Border Patrol veteran, after the Jan. 23 chase 
near Sasabe, Ariz., one of the most popular crossing points for migrants 
trying to get to prized jobs as cooks, nannies, and construction workers. 
“People who want to get into the U.S. really badly won’t let something 
like a fence get in the way.”132  
No matter how many miles of fence are constructed, how many agents patrol the 
border, or despite how up-to-date technology is, motivational factors such as willpower, 
perseverance, or money continue to influence illegal border crossings. This chapter will 
analyze the unintended consequences of fortifying the U.S.-Mexico border by examining 
how immigrants and drug smugglers adapt and innovate to overcome the U.S. border 
security and the negative outcomes of redirecting flow patterns. 
B. IMMIGRANTS 
In a survey conducted by Pew Research Center, the current estimate of 
unauthorized migrants residing within the United States is around 11.7 million.133 Even 
though 25 to 40 percent of these are people who entered legally on tourist or student 
visas, they stayed after the visa expired, which makes them both undocumented migrants 
                                                 
131 Ibid., 170. 
132 Geri Smith and Keith Epstein, “On the Border: The ‘Virtual Fence’ Isn’t Working,” Business 
Week, February 6, 2008, http://www.businessweek.com/stories/2008–02–06/on-the-border-the-virtual-
fence-isnt-working. 
133 Julia Preston, “Number of Illegal Immigrants in U.S. May Be on Rise Again, Estimates Say,” New 
York Times, September 23, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/24/us/immigrant-population-shows-
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and unauthorized residents.134 Even so, the security emphasis is still placed on securing 
the border.135 As the federal government increases border security, the result has been 
tighter control of some areas along the border. Tighter security has potentially exposed 
unauthorized migrants more harm than not.  
For example, unauthorized migrants are more likely to contact smugglers or 
coyotes and engage in documentation forgery than not.136 It is estimated that 75 percent 
of illegal aliens use falsified documents to gain employment.137 Most job-related identity 
theft occurs in states with high illegal immigration.138 In addition, migrants have an 
increased chance of becoming crime victims than non-migrants because they are 
intentionally avoiding law officials and often have large quantities of money on them.139 
Also, more would-be border crossers are now pushed into more remote and deserted 
areas along the border. Though the likelihood of detection is reduced, so is the possibility 
of surviving the journey for migrants because they are exposed to hyperthermia, 
hypothermia, dehydration, and possible drowning.140 It can be argued that the U.S. 
government’s border security efforts have adversely affected unauthorized migrants 
mortality rates and increased the probability of resorting to criminal activity.141  
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1. Death Rate 
On paper, as reported by the USBP statistics, it appears that the number of people 
trying to enter illegally into the United States has declined; yet the reported migrant 
deaths have not decreased in relation. From FY 2007 to FY 2011, illegal crossing 
attempts have dropped by 62 percent. As illegal traffic has either slowed, or diverted, the 
associated death rates has stayed consistent; however, the proportion of apprehensions to 
fatalities has increased.142 In FY 2012, Border Patrol reported finding 463 individuals 
dead, as opposed to 320 in FY 2002 (see Table 9).143 There has been a significant 
increase of death to live interceptions from 0.029 percent in FY2002 to 0.13 percent in 
FY 2012 (see Figure 5). Though the numbers appear small, it is an indication that when 
attempted, border-crossing is dangerous. It is also problematic to see an increase in 
number of deaths; especially as apprehensions are declining and immigration is being 
reported as net zero or less.144 These increases in fatalities also suggest that the border 
fence is not as effective as it is intended to be and that there is an inhumane price 
associated with border security.  
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Table 9.  Apprehensions and border deaths by fiscal year145 
 
Figure 5.  Apprehensions to death percentage  
                                                 
145 U.S. Customs and Border Protection, “Southwest Border Sectors;” U.S. Customs and Border 
















A report by the National Foundation for American Policy (NFAP) stated that the 
death rate for illegal immigrants attempting to cross the border in 2012 has risen 27 
percent from the previous year.146 This same NFAP report states if an unauthorized 
migrant tries to cross the border illegally today, then they are eight times more likely to 
die than 10 years ago.147 In 1998, the U.S. Border Patrol began documenting immigrant 
deaths. The 463 deaths in 2012 is the second largest documented number since 2005, 
when there were 492 immigrant deaths.148 From 1998 to 2012, the U.S. Border Patrol has 
found 5,595 dead bodies.149 The number of deaths is estimated to be significantly higher 
due to the inability to account for the decedents that are never found or were reported 
missing every fiscal year.150  
The Border Patrol has been criticized for this by human rights activists for a few 
reasons. Activists claim that BP disregards victims in car accidents, bodies found by 
other law enforcement agencies and officers, and skeletal remnants.151 Some criticize the 
discrepancies in the method of body counting, where some sectors include guides and 
smugglers who died and others do not, despite that the “Border Patrol policy is to include 
all deaths in the 43 counties within 100 miles of the U.S.-Mexico border.”152 U.S. 
authorities have countered critics by stating that mortalities on the Mexican side and 
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deaths external to the 100 mile zone are outside their operational scope. Also, when local 
agencies do find bodies they rarely inform the Border Patrol.153 
University of Arizona’s Binational Migration Institute (BMI) reported that 
fatalities in the Tucson sector have significantly increased since 1990; this corresponds to 
the border fortification beginnings in California and Texas.154 Since 2004, in Tucson, the 
Pima County Office of the Medical Examiner assesses an average of 150 remains a year 
just from border crossing attempts.155 BMI’s report “suggests migrants are crossing for 
longer periods of time through more remote areas to avoid detection by U.S. authorities, 
thus increasing the probability of death” as an explanation of the increase in deaths and 
lower apprehension statistics.156 In the American Public Health Association (APHA) 
policy statement, the border fortification accounts for unnecessary migrant deaths. It 
states, “The Border Patrol’s policy has resulted in the purposeful displacement and 
diversion of migrants into more treacherous and dangerous zones to cross, such as 
deserts, rivers, canals, and rugged terrain.”157 This is a consequence. It is the price that 
has and is currently being paid to preserve and maintain the illusion of security. The 
human rights organization, Humane Border, has recorded where the majority of deaths 
have occurred along with locations of its water stations on its “Death Map” (see Figure 
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Reservation, which is almost 6,000 miles of mountains and desert.158 In addition, the 
majority of deaths have occurred two days or 12 miles into the reservation.159 These 
deaths are an indicator of failure in the defensive barrier’s purpose: deterrence. Migrants 
are still making it across the border before they die. Also, the location and frequency of 
where bodies are found designate popular smuggling routes. The increase of migrant 
deaths raises an ethical dilemma of the value of human life versus protecting the nation’s 
inhabitants. Currently, it appears to be a cost that the country is willing to pay. 
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Figure 6.  Recorded deaths160 
                                                 




Besides death, injuries are another of the hidden cost associated with constructing 
defensive barriers. Every year thousands of unauthorized migrants are treated for injuries 
in U.S. health centers. The U.S. taxpayers pay over $4.3 billion to treat unauthorized 
immigrants, predominantly in free health clinics and emergency rooms.161 Dr. Lynn 
Gries, a trauma surgeon at the University of Arizona Medical Center in Tucson (UAMC), 
stated that since 2007, UAMC averages 30 to 50 fence related injured people a year.162 
UAMC is a Level 1 trauma center, where the severely injured are brought. In 2010, a 
high for fence related injuries, UAMC had 60 people who suffered from spinal injuries, 
bodies “crumpled like a beer can,” and shattered bones transported in.163 UAMC’s Dr. 
John Ruth, head of orthopedic surgery argues “The wall is a constant source of 
injuries.”164 The lucky ones are the patients who suffer from bone compression compared 
to the ones whose bones shatter, thus sending splinters all throughout the body; the 
severity of the splintering depends on the impact. 165 Others end up crippled, paralyzed, 
or have hands, legs, or feet amputated. These injuries are the result of being pushed by 
smugglers or falling because the ladder or rope was too short for the area of the wall they 
were climbing. Once stable, they are deported and are part of the average $2.5 billion 
expenditure the U.S. government spends on detention and removal of illegal aliens.166 
This is a small example of just one area of the border, there are many more that are 
injured everyday while trying to crossover.  
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3. Immigration Circularity Broken—Longer Stays 
U.S.-Mexico border fortifications, fencing and increased manning, have caused 
both the risk and cost of border crossing to increase. This effect has generated an 
immigration prison, meaning that unauthorized immigrants are quasi-locked within the 
U.S. because of the risks and costs associated with trying to return if they leave for a 
while. Instead of returning home, immigrants remain within the U.S. because this choice 
is a lower associated risk. This has ended circularity of the migration cycle and created a 
more permanent immigration base in America.167 Douglas Massey posits that the U.S. 
government destroyed a “well-functioning, predicable system into a noisy, clunking, 
dysfunctional machine that generated a host of unanticipated outcomes.”168 One such 
outcome of increased migrants is that the U.S. government spent roughly $3.46 trillion in 
services and benefits for illegal immigrants in FY 2010 alone, according to a National 
Research Council report.169 In addition, state and local governments paid $1.94 trillion in 
the same year.170 This equates to a total cost of $5.4 trillion dollars for FY2010 to the 
American taxpayer; who picks up the bill for the growing number of permanent 
unauthorized migrants. 
C. EXPLOITATION OF MIGRANTS THROUGH HUMAN SMUGGLING, 
VIOLATION, ABUSE, AND EXTORTION 
Increasing border security has created a wicked problem in relation to drug 
trafficking organization (DTO) operations, specifically smuggling both human and 
narcotics into the U.S. Tightening of border controls has made it harder and increased the 
risk associated for smuggling, thereby increasing both cost and potential profit. As risk 
increases, so does the profit; the cost of doing business is transferred to the consumer in 
the form of raised price. Bigger profits entices these organizations, which have vast 
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resources at their disposal, to control access to the border. The involvement of resource 
rich criminal organizations then makes it harder to prevent crime; consequently, the cycle 
continues to drive itself.  
1. Smuggling 
Human smugglers commonly referred to as “coyotes” or “polleros” are often 
employed by unauthorized migrants (pollos) to enter into the United States.171 The use of 
coyotes has been on the upswing. From 2005–2007, the average migrant of reliance on 
these smugglers reached into the 90 percentile and continues to increase as U.S. border 
security tightens.172 Majority of the time immigrants have no choice but to hire a coyote; 
DTOs will kill or beat migrants if they attempt to pass through their “area” without 
paying.173 As the risk of crossing increases, so does the cost that is passed down to the 
coyote’s customers.  
Studies conducted by Princeton University Mexican Migration Project (MMP) 
and the University of California, San Diego (UCSD) Mexican Migration Field Research 
Program (MMFRP) indicate that prices began to increase around 1994 and have 
continued to increase from 1994 to 2002, at roughly 11 percent a year.174 In 2002, the 
price was around $2000. From 2002 and beyond, the two studies differ in the average 
increase each year, Princeton’s mean was 3.7 percent compared to UCSD’s 1.8 percent 
increase.175 The current estimated average cost is $3,000 to cross the border.176  
The smuggling methods used by coyotes are not always the safest either. On May 
2003, in Texas, 19 dead unauthorized migrants were discovered in an airless truck 
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trailer.177 In Iowa, migrants have also been found dead in a railway car.178 According to a 
National Public Radio (NPR) story, migrants are frequently squeezed into vehicles to the 
point of near suffocation. Migrants are lucky when smugglers even remember to bring 
water, much less food while in transit. Carlos, a captured migrant, stated he went five 
days without food and a day and a half without water before being apprehended by the 
Border Patrol.179 Had the 30 person group not been caught, the smugglers would have 
made over $90,000 in one week. These are just a few examples of the horrors suffered by 
migrants.  
2. Violating Migrants  
For years, transiting immigrants have been at the mercy of others, but the 
conditions seem to be getting worse. A reason for this is that criminal organizations are 
intensifying their control and territory in areas where migrants travel. Also, these criminal 
organizations have expanded their interests outside of drug trafficking and into other 
areas such as extortion, kidnapping, and human smuggling.180 Tightened border security 
has driven up the cost and demand for these organizations, which thrive on making 
extortion a sophisticated and profitable criminal business.181  
a. Kidnapping 
Migrants are often kidnapped and detained in “drop houses” until families can pay 
their ransoms. Due to their vulnerability, these people are easily exploited. Even deported 
migrants in detention centers are exposed because their clothing, tattoos, and lack of any 
documentation marks them as targets.182 Three people were deported to Tijuana, were 
later they are kidnapped, beaten, and threatened with death, so their families in the U.S. 
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would pay a ransom of $5000.183 Often hostages are tortured for phone numbers of their 
families in the United States. These victims are frequently raped, starved, forced to watch 
others by executed, and sleep deprived. According to a report in 2011 by the Commission 
on Human Rights, criminal organizations ransom demands range between $1,500 and 
$5,000, which earns them roughly one million within six months—just from 
kidnappings.184 This practice is recurring enough that U.S. law enforcement officials 
have taken notice, even though the abductions occurs less frequently in the U.S. than in 
Mexico.185 According to a report by Isacson and Meyer,  
This was confirmed by officials from the Pima County Sherriff’s 
department interviewed in Tucson. Some kidnapped migrants, they noted, 
are taken from their smugglers by a rival group and held for ransom, a 
practice some law enforcement agencies term “coyote rips;” other cases 
involve the same smuggler that transported the migrants across the border 
refusing to release them from the “drop houses” until their families pay an 
additional fee, sometimes thousands of dollars more than the original 
price.186 
In 2009, a house with 30 hostages was found. These migrants were beaten and 
threatened at gun point and being held for $5,000; this was a $1000 more than what they 
had originally agreed to pay.187 Phoenix is becoming America’s kidnapping capital.188 
Every year law enforcement authorities discover more “drop houses,” showing a 
significant shift in the human smuggling enterprise as these profitable opportunities 
attract criminal organizations. The tougher border enforcement in Texas and California 
have created a funneling effect through Arizona’s desert with is controlled by these 
organizations.189 In a recent study by the University of Arizona, covering from Tijuana to 
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Nuevo Laredo, the authors interviewed 1,113 immigrants in migrant shelters and found 
seven percent (83) were kidnapped. Of these 83 people, 44 abducted by their guide or 
coyote, 29 kidnapped within the U.S., 24 of those were kidnapped by gangs, five of them 
were kidnapped specifically by Los Zetas, and two by Mexican authorities; two of the 83 
observed homicides, and six observed rape.190 17 percent of the 83 were involved in 
cyber kidnappings, a kidnapper calls with fabricated information stating a family member 
was kidnapped in order to extract money.191  
b. Abandoned 
Betzi Younglas, a Humane Borders volunteer, explains:  
people are getting left behind a lot more than they used to. When they see 
the patrol, they scatter. They’ll be lucky to find your coyote again because 
the first thing the coyotes do is take away anything that might tell you 
where you are. They want you to be dependent.192  
Frequently, migrants are told by their coyotes it is only a two to three day walk to 
Phoenix when realistically it is over a week. Migrants rarely show themselves unless they 
need assistance; even if migrants are able to call for help, they have unclear knowledge of 
their location to direct would-be assistants.193 Of the University of Arizona study, over a 
quarter (27 percent) were abandoned by their coyotes while attempting the cross.194  
3. Abuse 
a. Border Patrol 
The U.S. Border Patrol has come under scrutiny for human rights violations 
against immigrants by different activists. In 2011, a published report by Arizona’s No 
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More Deaths organization, A Culture of Cruelty, is based on more than 4,000 interviews 
of 12,895 people who had been detained by Border Patrol in the border towns of Agua 
Prieta, Naco, and Nogales.195 The group detected 12 areas in the Border Patrol’s 
treatment of unauthorized immigrants that needed improvement:  
[D]enial of or insufficient water; denial of or insufficient food; failure to 
provide medical treatment or access to medical professionals; inhumane 
processing center conditions; verbal abuse; physical abuse; psychological 
abuse; dangerous transportation practices; separation of family members; 
dangerous repatriation practices; failure to return personal belongings; and 
due process concerns.196  
In this group interviewed, No More Deaths reported that 10 percent suffered from 
physical abuse, including hitting, kicking, chokeholds, and sexual assault by the Border 
Patrol. Verbal abuse, including racial slurs, was reported by 13 percent of the 12,895, and 
the majority of people needed medical treatment.197 Another organization reported in 
2010, “7.1 percent of migrants deported by U.S. authorities suffered physical abuse when 
pursued or detained; 13.7 percent experienced verbal abuse, and 8.3 percent are stripped 
of their personal possessions.”198 University of Arizona study stated that 11 percent of 
the 12,895 group reported physical abuse, 23 percent experienced verbal abuse, 45 
percent stated while detained they did not get sufficient food, 39 percent had possessions 
confiscated and never returned.199 At least 20 people have died allegedly from Border 
Patrol using excessive force since January 2010. Of those 20 dead migrants, seven were 
under the age of 21, six were killed while on the Mexican side of the border, eight of the 
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20 were shot and killed after throwing rocks at Border Patrol officers, and five were 
American citizens.200  
In another incident, agents using a stun gun and a baton struck Anastasio 
Hernandez-Rojas as he resisted arrest; he died from his wounds in May 2010. A group of 
Mexican teenagers throwing rocks at an U.S. Border Patrol agent resulted in one being 
shot and killed in June 2010. A court overturned a lawsuit and stated that the shooting 
occurred in Mexico, and the 15-year-old boy was not covered under excessive force laws 
in 2012.201 An incident of excessive force occurred this year, as a video recording of a 
Border Patrol trying to arrest an unauthorized migrant was recorded January 15, 2014.202 
This video only shows a portion of what happened, but it does portray the Border Patrol 
in a negative light. Even though this thesis has only highlighted a few incidents, there 
appears to be a problem that needs to be addressed. 
4. Forced Labor 
With tightened security, many smugglers have expanded into human trafficking 
business to make up the expenses. Immigrants are being used as forced labor, slaves, or 
even sold into prostitution by criminal organizations.203 In February 2013, the Mexican 
army found a tunnel that had 17 immigrants who supposedly had been kidnapped and 
forced to excavate passageways for three months.204 These immigrants stated that the 
smugglers promised to help them cross the border, but later smugglers threatened to kill 
them and their family members if they did not dig. After being abandoned by their 
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coyote, a family was approached by someone willing to help them. They were held 
captive and told to pay $5000 or they would have to work their debt off.205 
D. FENCES VERSUS DRUG TRAFFICKING ORGANIZATIONS: OVER, 
UNDER, THROUGH THE FENCE TO THE UNITED STATES WE GO 
DTOs make an estimated $10 to $40 billion dollars a year, and the United States 
is the world’s largest drug market.206 As border security has intensified, DTOs have 
resorted to alternative solutions in order to keep their illicit organizations in business. 
Another unintended consequence is the Drug Trafficking Organizations’ ability to adapt 
and innovate new ways of infiltrating into the United States. Some of these methods 
include going over, traveling under, and through the defensive barriers erected by the 
United States (see Figure 7). The DTOs substantial resources and flexibility allow them 
to adjust their operations to avoid detection more readily than the U.S. government can 
produce ways to stop them. In other words, they have more resources and fewer 
restrictions to have a fast innovation cycle. 
 
Figure 7.  Example of Sinaloa’s methods of smuggling207  
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1. Over the Fence 
a. Ramps 
DTOs have developed several techniques to triumph over defensive barriers. 
Some common methods are ramps, guns, old-fashioned climbing with or without ropes 
and ladders. On October 31, 2012, Border Patrol near Yuma, Arizona confiscated a Jeep 
Cherokee that was left on the wall. Smugglers had attempted to drive over the 14-foot 
fence using improvised ramps, but became stuck at the vehicles center point due to a 
steep incline and decline.208 In other incidents, flatbed trucks have been used to backup 
to vehicle barriers so that drug filled vehicles can be dropped off the back and onto the 
U.S. side.209  
b. Cannons 
On February 26, 2013, Mexican police arrested a man who was using an 
improvised cannon, which looked like a massive potato gun, to launch containers of 
marijuana over the border fence into California.210 These plastic air-powered cannons are 
able to propel these projectiles, up to 28 pounds a shot, 500 feet beyond the border.211 
Even t-shirt cannons, such as those often used at sporting events, have been known to be 
used to transport drugs across.212 
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Often simplistically designed catapults have been discovered out in the desert by 
Mexican law enforcement.213 Former DEA chief of operations Michael Braun stated,  
They erect this fence, only to go out there a few days later and discover 
that these guys have a catapult, and they’re flinging hundred-pound bales 
of marijuana over to the other side. We’ve got the best fence money can 
buy, and they counter us with a 2,500-year-old technology.214  
The incident proved that these organizations are extremely adaptive and that 
innovating is their best asset. Even ultra-light aircrafts have been confiscated by agents. 
One such craft, carrying 253 pounds of marijuana, was apprehended in Tucson in 
December 2008.215 
d. Ladders and Ropes 
Another method seen is the use of ladders and ropes to scale wall sections. There 
tools that are either brought with the people, or a designated person rides out and hangs 
them for people to climb and then returns later to collect the ropes. Even screwdrivers are 
used to as handholds to climb fencing. The prevailing method to scale fencing is for a 
vehicle to pull up to the fence, people climb onto the roof and jump over.216 
2. Under the Wall 
Joaquin Guzman, known as El Chapo, is the leader of the Sinaloa cartel is said to 
be an outside-the-box thinker. He is recognized as the first to use underground 
passageways for smuggle in drug and people into America. According to New York 
Times, article, “Chapo’s greatest contribution to the evolving tradecraft of drug 
trafficking was one of those innovations that seem so logical in hindsight; it’s a wonder 
nobody thought of it before: a tunnel.”217 El Chapo hired an architect to plan out a tunnel 
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into the United States. It was equipped with hydraulic system, secret levers, and was 200 
feet long. To this day, it is still a viable option; entrances to smuggling tunnels are still 
hidden in plain sight. On July 12, 2012, in Tijuana, one such entrance was found in a 
warehouse, beneath a bathroom sink. This 220 yard passageway was equipped with 
lighting and ventilation.218 Over a hundred tunnels have been detected since El Chapo’s. 
They have been known to be up to half a mile long, equipped with a rail systems for 
heavy loads, air-conditioning, lighting, and ventilation.219  
The latest “super tunnel” discovered was 2.4 miles long from San Diego to 
Tijuana. It was almost four feet tall, three feet wide, and 35 feet below the surface and 
connected warehouses.220 Since 2010, it was the fifth large-scale tunnel found.221 The 
clay-like earth in the San Diego/Tijuana region makes it easier to excavate and cave-ins 
are less likely, and there are an abundance of warehouses to hide entrances and 
smuggling activities.222  
Smugglers have even penetrated drainage systems that run between different 
border towns, such as the one from Nogales, Arizona to Nogales, Mexico and all over the 
border El Paso to San Diego. Border agents found an unfinished tunnel within the 
drainage system by noticing recently disturbed soil on the floor. Tunnels within the 
Nogales area are rudimentary, which integrate into the drainage system, compared to the 
sophisticated “super tunnels” in San Diego. The Nogales tunnels are dug by miners and 
labors using hand tools, and the dirt is carried out by buckets verses the high-tech tunnels 
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designed by engineers and miners around San Diego.223 Even so, since 2009, agents have 
found over 20 tunnels in this area.224 
3. Around the Border 
Another popular and high risk option available to smugglers is to go around the 
San Diego fence by sea. Often smugglers and immigrants wait for the cover of night, fog, 
or rain to attempt crossing.225 Many immigrants attempt to swim through the strong 
currents in hopes of reaching American beaches. Smugglers have taken to using small 
vessels; these are often utilized for both drug and human smuggling. These old wooden 
single engine boats, weighted down by cargo, give them a smaller profile that is difficult 
to see on radars. Additionally, night vision is limited by distance. Smugglers charge fees 
ranging from $7000 to $10,000 to cross; one boatload can make up to $200,000 a trip.226 
Lookouts are posted before a boat is scheduled to land, normally close to a road and look 
for border patrol. Border officials have been noticing the increase in boats over the last 
few years, and the number of abandoned boats on the U.S. shores has increased. Yet, it is 
hard to catch every attempt in the 400 square mile of Pacific Ocean that extends from Los 
Angeles to Tijuana.227  
4. Through the Barrier 
In Arizona’s deserts, drugs continue to be smuggled in by foot and horseback 
through the vehicle barriers. Lee Eseman, park manager, says since the vehicle barriers 
were installed they have seen an increase in people (drug mules) walking drugs through. 
Eseman remembers seeing “mules” waiting at the border for a drug vehicle to approach. 
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Drug bales are loaded onto the people’s backs; they proceed over the barriers and the 
“mule” train begins their excursion.228 These bundles can weigh up to 50 pounds, and the 
human mules will walk for hours to days.229 In areas with pedestrian fencing, sections of 
fencing are cut to make a door or even torn down with a truck and chain. On YouTube, 
there are videos posted of a people, while only using a vehicle jack, are able to lift a 
section of the wall. On one video, within five minutes the fence is elevated and a group of 
people dash underneath it into the U.S. Then, the section is put back in its original place 
as if it was never disturbed.230  
A tactic that is occurring more frequently is to split groups along various areas 
along the border. After observing law enforcement patterns through a series of lookouts, 
one group is sent over to be targeted by the USBP.231 This group is used as a diversion so 
the other groups can escape. Or other groups of people and drugs are sent across while 
the Border Patrol is distracted.232 The diversion group is usually arrested, but drug 
organizations only lose a portion of cargo while more is able to get through. Sometimes 
they are able to escape back across the border to try again. Two drug smugglers were able 
to escape by using, “homemade spikes—nails welded together to pop the tires of Border 
Patrol truck—and that was all they needed.”233 These attempts demonstrate that the 
defensive barrier is porous; otherwise, DTOs would not be trying.  
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E. FIXING THE FENCES 
In FY 2010, there were over 4,000 documented fence breaches that had to be 
repaired, according to the CBP.234 Each incident averaged $1,800 in repair costs and a 
total cost of over $7.2 million in breach repairs.235 Despite these violations, the CBP 
stated a control increase within the southwest defensive barrier, but the impact of the 
fencing and other infrastructure could not individually be accounted for.236 On July 29, 
2011, Kellogg Brown & Root Company won a government contract to maintain and 
repair Arizona’s 378 mile border fence. This one year contract cost $7.7 million and has 
the possibilities of two one year extensions, for a three year total cost of $24.4 million.237 
F. CONCLUSION 
Enhancements in U.S.-Mexico border security have caused unintended adverse 
effects. Tightened security has shifted migration patterns away from heavily fortified 
areas, increased the travel periods, and increased the usage and necessity of human 
smugglers, instead of deterrence.238 Increased fortifications have also pushed criminal 
organizations to find creative solutions to continue making enormous profits off of the 
demands of the American drug market and those of the unauthorized migrants. 
Adaptation and innovation are two factors that the United States is unequipped to handle 
and slow in regards to border security violations. The fact that DTOs are creative, 
constantly looking for new effective, innovative techniques, or relying on tried-and-true 
methods to smuggle in their human cargo or drug products over the years is astonishing. 
Currently, despite how much money or resources the U.S. government invests into the 
border, it does not appear that this strategy will ever be enough to stop these 
organizations or people. Criminal organizations are business oriented, if they do not meet 
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the demands, they know that someone else will and the cycle continues. With the belief 
of employment and other factors, determined unauthorized immigrants will continue to 
pursue and pay smugglers to achieve entry into the U.S. As long as there is a demand for 
drugs or smugglers, someone will take the risk to reap the rewards.  
The current U.S. strategy and policy solutions for the U.S.-Mexico border have 
resulted in increases of both morbidity and mortality rates instead of deterring criminal 
activity. These injuries and deaths represent the actual effectiveness of the border and 
immigration policies. Border Patrol is only the enforcer of the policy; it is the politicians 
who need to look at the causes of migration and develop an effective solution instead of 
pumping more resources into the border. Fortification has also increased the need for 
coyotes, who exploit these desperate people. The demand for smugglers often leaves 
immigrants vulnerable to abuse, kidnapping, abandonment, and forced labor. This wicked 
problem will never end because people, criminals and migrants alike, are determined and 
willing to what they have to do to get what they want. Unauthorized migrants will 
continue to enter illegally if they believe they can have a better life in the United States. 
DTOs will continue to meet the needs of the largest drug market if the profits are there.  
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The tragic event in September of 2001 left the United States with a sense of 
vulnerability and created both the demand and need to protect the nation. However, 
fortifying the border has created diminishing returns, negative side effects, and 
unintended consequences. The last one undermines the very nature and reason of 
installing a border fence. Immigrants have been forced into the hands of criminal 
organizations and are more vulnerable now than in the past. Building a wall may deter 
some illicit activity, but it does not affect the motivational factors of why people want to 
cross the U.S.-Mexico border. By hardening the borderline, the U.S. has issued a 
challenge, practically daring anyone to attempt entry. Even though immigration has been 
reduced, criminal organizations have picked up the gauntlet thrown by the United States 
and are finding ingenious methods to overcome and bypass the challenge created by 
tightening border controls. Determined and motivated people will continue to find a way, 
even if it takes multiple times to find loopholes and weakness in the border. According to 
one author, “Walls don’t work simply because people are too inventive in circumventing 
them.”239 Border policy has resulted in attracting DTOs, stimulating innovation, and 
creating sophisticated networks within the black market arena. 
B. DIMINISHING RETURNS 
The expenditure of supporting, maintaining, and sustaining border control is 
escalating and diminished returns are mounting. With increased technology, fencing, and 
personnel the cost associated with apprehending unauthorized immigrants intensifies 
every year. This ratio will continue if Border Patrol apprehensions statistics persist to 
dwindle, as apprehensions are already at an all-time low. Conversely, the number of 
southwest border agents has doubled in less than 10 years. Within the last 11 years, the 
USBP budget has tripled. It is becoming excessive and ridiculous; the nation averages 
fewer than 20 apprehensions a year in some sectors and dramatically smaller in other 
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sectors, and at a cost of $10,000 per arrest, which includes multiple attempts by the same 
people. If the government continues with its current strategy, increasing personnel and 
resources investments, the associated costs will continue to escalate. 
C. NEGATIVE SIDE EFFECTS / UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES 
Border controls have destroyed the migration cycle between the United States and 
Mexico, which has resulted in more unauthorized migrants deciding to remain within the 
U.S. territory. This choice minimizes their risk because the cost of reentry has become 
too high for them. In addition, human rights violations and border-related death rates 
continue to accumulate. The border controls have resulted in increased burdens to 
taxpayers.  
The biggest unintended consequence is that the wall has failed to neither prevent 
nor deter any illicit criminal activity. Access to borderlands and potential profits has 
drawn the attention of DTOs, who fight for access and control of transportation routes. 
Human smuggling, kidnapping, and extortion are areas outside of narcotics that have 
proven profitable for criminal organizations. The border fence only slows them down 
until they can come up with a resourceful method, to circumvent the defensive barrier, 
either tried and true, or imaginative and inventive new ones.  
D. RESULTS 
The results and conclusion of this thesis indicated that the first hypothesis was 
incorrect and confirmed the second hypothesis. Borders walls and increased USBP 
personnel both appear to be useful and influence immigration. However, the cost 
associated with fortifying the border fence along with the expansion of personnel and 
support are not cost effective, as demonstrated in a previous chapter. In addition, the 
border security increases have reached a culminating point of diminishing returns. Also, 
the defensive barrier has been unsuccessful in deterred illicit activity. In fact, the 
fortification and tightening of border controls have increased the risk and created a 
demand that has attracted illicit activity. DTOs have expanded their franchises to increase 
the size of their profits. Border security efforts have encouraged and supported an 
innovation environment in order to defeat border controls.  
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E. FINAL THOUGHTS 
History demonstrates that walls are not a long-term solution to problems; yet the 
federal government keeps returning to stringent border fences, such as the Great Wall of 
China or Berlin Wall, as its primary solution to solve its security dilemma. The U.S.-
Mexico border is that of the Maginot Line, an impressive presence that is useless in 
preventing illegal activity. More fences, manpower, and technology on the U.S.-Mexico 
border does not appear to be a very effective nor efficient solution to shrink illegal cross 
border movement. It has done the opposite; it has bolstered an atmosphere and is seen as 
a challenge for criminal organization’s ingenuity to defeat. The majority of border 
security still is not participating in the prevention of terrorism, only countering trafficking 
and immigration.  
At the end of the day, the cost of maintaining a defensive border fence continues 
to grow rapidly; this price tag has surpassed the point of accumulation and is creating 
diminished returns. Any additional increase in border resources would prove to be 
unnecessary. A fence is merely a Band-Aid covering up the underlying problem of the 
U.S. government: America needs a better alternative solution to fix illegal immigration 
and criminal organizations illicit activities. The Border Patrol are not the ones in charge 
of making the rules; they merely enforce them for politicians, who need to develop a 
more effective and efficient solution. As of now, it appears that these are risks politicians 
are will to accept to maintain the illusion of controlling the U.S. border, regardless of the 
growing cry for immigration reform. Like history has taught, all walls come down. 
In addition, the United States and Mexico are attached together by geography, 
economics, demographics, and history. With the blending of cultures, expanding trade 
and transportation networking, the continuous daily flow of people across the border, 
both countries are fundamentally connected. The United States and Mexico need to 
acknowledge this interdependency and continue to promote bilateral cooperation in 
regard to immigration reform and reducing drug trafficking organizations.  
Currently, the border fence has been effective in deterring some illegal migration, 
but in respect to a terrorist threat, its effectiveness remains unknown as terrorist 
 64
organizations have yet to challenge the defensive barrier. However, it is clear that current 
border control methods are not adequately addressing the DTO threat. The challenge the 
U.S. government needs to address are efficiency and effective alternative methods to 
better use already appropriated resources. Alternative methods such as reforming 
immigration policy, better visa monitoring systems to reduce the demand for illicit 
organization, and reestablish the migration cycle. Or the government can shift more 






APPENDIX A. TYPES OF DEFENSIVE BORDER FENCING 
 
Figure 8.  Vehicle fencing outside of El Paso240  
 
Figure 9.  Vehicle Bollards outside El Paso241  
                                                 





Figure 10.  Yuma Sector—the truck is dragging tires so USBP can tell when 
people cross at night.242  
 
Figure 11.  Wire mesh fence outside El Centro243  





Figure 12.  Landing mat fence in El Centro244  
 
Figure 13.  Metal mesh fence in Yuma Sector245  
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APPENDIX B. FENCE BREACHES 
 
Figure 14.  Fence breach in Tucson246  
 
Figure 15.  Tunnel between Tijuana and San Diego.247 
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Figure 16.  Suspected drug smugglers248  
                                                 
248 U.S. Customs and Border Protection, “Photo Gallery.” 
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